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Abstract
In this paper we study the structure of labor market ‡ows in Spain
and compare them with France and the US. We characterize a number
of empirical regularities and stylized facts. One striking result is that
the job …nding rate is slightly higher than in France, while the jon
loss rate is much higher, putting Spain half-way between France and
the US. This suggests that while Spain has borne the full cost of its
labor market reforms in terms of job precarity, the bene…ts in terms
of job creation have been quite modest. We hypothesize that this has
been due to the reform’s credibility being imperfect, which leads to
expectation of reversal.
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11 Introduction
Among European countries characterized by rigid labor markets, Spain is
notable for a certain number of speci…c characteristics. First, over the last
25 years its unemployment rate has virtually been the highest in Europe,
oscillating between 15 % and an appalling 25 %. Second, at face value it
has one of the most rigid set of institutions, in particular concerning the
structure of collective bargaining and employment protection legislation.1 It
di¤ers from other European countries, however, in having implemented a far-
reaching liberalization of employment protection regulation. This liberaliza-
tion occurred in 1984, when, rather than reducing dismissal costs across the
board, which would have been politically unfeasible, the government eased
the use of temporary labor contracts2. Following this reform an employment
boom occurred, where temporary contracts accounted for almost 95 % of
new hires, and quickly reached a 30 % employment share. However, in the
subsequent recession of the mid-nineties, employment dropped very quickly
as …rms could easily get rid of their temporary workers. In the end, there is
no strong evidence that such a reform reduced unemployment.
This does not mean, however, that the reform has not a¤ected the struc-
ture of the labor market. It is reasonable to speculate that it has increased
labor turnover, and even absent a positive e¤ect on the aggregate stock of
unemployment, this may be considered as bene…cial as the duration of un-
employment is reduced.
In order to learn more about the e¤ect of the reform, or more generally the
speci…cs of the Spanish labor market compared to other European countries,
this paper compares unemployment levels and transition rates by education,
sex,and age groups for Spain, France and the U.S. We take France as a similar
1See Blanchard et al. (1995).
2See Segura et al. (1991), Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992), Bentolila and Dolado (1994),
Jimeno and Toharia (1991) for an account of this episode.
1European-style country, but where reform has been much more timid, while
the U.S. is the benchmark case of a competitive labor market.
A previous study by Cohen et al. (1997) has shown quite similar un-
employment rates by cells, thus ascribing a great deal of the unemployment
di¤erential between France and the US to a composition e¤ect due to the
higher proportion of americans who go to college. They have also shown that
despite these similar unemployment rates, the labor market in France func-
tioned quite di¤erently from the US one, since the exit from unemployment
was much lower in France, and consequently the duration of unemployment
was much longer. The similar unemployment rates came from the fact that
the job loss rate was also much smaller in France than in the US, presum-
ably because of more stringent job protection legislation and/or a cultural
aversion to dismissals.
We look at the same variables as Cohen et al, using a decomposition of
the population into three age, two sex, and four education groups. We also
systematically report the numbers they …nd in order to ease the comparison.
Finally, we look at some deeper characteristics of the Spanish labor market
such as duration dependence and unemployment recurrence.3
The main lessons of the paper are as follows.
First, and most importantly, the large unemployment di¤erential between
France and Spain is mostly explained by a much larger job loss rate in Spain
compared to France rather than a smaller job …nding rate. Indeed, the job
…nding rate is also higher in Spain, but only marginally, while the job loss
rate is substantially higher, putting Spain half-way between France and the
U.S.
This suggests that Spain has the ”worst of both worlds”, namely a job
creation rate similar to that of a ”rigid economy”’ and a job destruction rate
3Our …ndings are roughly in accordance with other Spanish studies on ‡ows, such as
Garcia Perez (1997) and Garcia-Fontes and Hopenhayn (1993).
2comparable to that of a ‡exible one. Therefore, while employers do take
advantage of the margin of ‡exibility allowed by temporary contracts at the
time of …ring, they do not consider that their availability reduces labor costs
signi…cantly. Following an argument developed by Bertola and Ichino (1996),
one may speculate that this is due to the reform lacking credibility. That is,
…rms have been unsure about whether the reform would not be overturned,
with some discretionary tightening of the conditions under which temporary
contracts may be used. Consequently, they have been cautious when hiring
people, fearing that …ring restrictions might be increased between now and
the time they might want to get rid of their workers. While lower …ring
costs increase dismissals right away, it is the expectation of lower …ring costs
in the future which increases hirings. The impact of the reduction in …ring
costs on hirings is lower, the less con…dent are …rms that the reform won’t
be overturned. Hence, for a reduction in employment protection to increase
hirings, it is fundamental for the reform to be credible.
Second, the young su¤er more from unemployment relative to the middle-
aged in both Spain and France compared to the U.S. (where it is also true
that they su¤er more). It is often believed that this is due to rigidities
such as the minimum wage which make it too costly for employers to hire
youngsters. Our data on ‡ows suggest that this interpretation is wrong. In
fact, in all three countries a young unemployed person is more likely to …nd a
job than a middle aged. Their greater unemployment rate is explained by a
greater in‡ow into unemployment, not a smaller out‡ow. We interpret that
…nding as evidence that in France and Spain, the bulk of ‡exibility has been
concentrated on young people.
Third, we …nd evidence of path dependence in labor market transitions.
This means that an unemployed worker is more likely to be in unemployment
a year from now than his monthly exit rate would suggest. This feature may
be due to either duration dependence, i.e. falling exit rates with the length
3of the unemployment spell, or unemployment recurrence, i.e. a higher job
loss rate in one’s next job than if the person had not gone through an unem-
ployment spell. While duration dependence is documented by the existing
literature, we …nd that unemployment recurrence is also present, although
it does not appear to be a very strong phenomenon. This is somewhat sur-
prising in the light of the presumption that a worker is very likely to exit
unemployment with a temporary contract, and suggests that these contracts
have not concentrated the burden of mobility on a subset of people who
would move between employment and unemployment4 (abstracting from the
age dimension). Otherwise, one would probably have observed stronger un-
employment recurrence.
Finally, there is evidence that the unemployed are twice less successful at
…nding jobs than employed job seekers. We interpret this as employers giv-
ing preference to employed applicants in their hirings decisions. According
to Kugler and Saint-Paul (2000), this discrimination against the unemployed
is due to employment protection legislation; it explains why job-to-job moves
account for a much greater fraction of worker reallocation in Europe com-
pared to the U.S.; it also suggests that a reduction in employment protection
legislation would reduce employers’ discrimination against the unemployed.
2 The composition of the labour force.
Following Cohen et al., we start by looking at the compositioon of the labor
force across cells de…ned by age, sex, and education. Here we report the
composition of the labor force split under three educational categories, which
correspond to primary, secondary, and tertiary education, respectively. When
we will deal with Spain alone, we will further distinguish between vocational
4This is somewhat at variance with the conclusion reached by Alba-Ramirez (1997),
although it is a clear case of a bottle being half-empty and half-full.
4training and general training, as far as secondary education is concerned.
But for the sake of comparison with France and the U.S. it is better to use
three categories.
Cohen et al. could explain a large fraction of the unemployment di¤eren-
tial between France and the US by a composition e¤ect. For example, for the
core age group of males, all of the unemployment di¤erential was explained
by the fact that on average French workers are less educated. The same was
true for women provided one looked at non-employment rates rather than
employment rates. In Spain, where the unemployment rate is almost twice
as high as in France, there is no way one can explain high unemployment
by a simple composition e¤ect. However, the composition e¤ect is present,
since the composition of the workforce is di¤erent.
France USA Spain
E1 35.9 16.7 45:05
All E2 48.1 60.1 45
E3 15.7 23 9:925
E1 32.5 29.2 11:1
16-24 E2 60.0 63.1 83:0
E3 7.4 7.7 6.1
E1 30.6 11.6 40:55
25-49 E2 51.0 60.6 45:2
E3 18.5 27.7 14:1
E1 58.0 22.8 83:5
50-64 E2 31.6 55.4 11:7
E3 10.4 21.7 5:2
Table 1: composition of the workforce.
As can be seen in Table 1, Spain turns out to be the least educated of the
three, as one would hazve expected. However, for the most recent generation,
5Spain seems to be quite ahead of France and the U.S. in terms of lifting the
whole population above level E1 (primary school only). This represents a
truly amazing e¤ort given that for the older generation more than 80 % of
the population did not exceed that level! We expect this improvement in
the quality of the Spanish workforce to contribute to a reduction in Spanish
unemployment in the future.
3 Unemployment Rates
We now turn to a comparison of unemployment rates across groups and
countries. Table 2 reports unemployment rates by categories for males, and
table 3 does the same for females.
France USA Spain
E1 27.8 17.4 44.2
16-24 E2 14.3 8.45 36
E3 8.0 3.3 52.7
E1 10.8 10.8 18.7
25-49 E2 5.25 5.03 15.4
E3 2.6 2.4 11.1
E1 11.1 6.6 13.5
50-64 E2 6 3.2 9.1
E3 4.0 1.9 2.6
Table 2: male unemployment rates by categories.5
5Source: Cohen et al. (1997) for France and the US, Our computations from EPA
for Spain. The years were1989 for USA, 1990 for France and 1994 for Spain, which have
similar growth rates of about 2.5 %.
6France USA Spain
E1 39.6 16.4 53
16-24 E2 23.1 8.4 48.8
E3 7.5 2.4 60.5
E1 16.7 10.4 30.8
25-49 E2 10 4.4 32.8
E3 4.6 2.2 20.4
E1 14.3 4.0 14.9
50-64 E2 10.1 2.64 17.4
E3 2.9 1.1 2.2
Table 3: female unemployment by categories
The similarities between France and the US regarding the core age group
obviously breaks down when Spain enters into the picture, as Spain has an
unemployment rate about twice as high as France. Nevertheless the prop-
erty that the young are the most harmed is true of Spain as of France. But
the composition e¤ect certainly explains a lower fraction of Spanish unem-
ployment than when one compares France and the US. Nevertheless, the
unemployment di¤erential between the most and least educated in the core
age group is 7 % for men and 10 % for women. The rapid improvement in
the quality of the Spanish workforce documented in the previous section will
therefore reduce unemployment by a substantial amount. Although the net
e¤ect crucially depends on elasticities of substitution across groups as well
as the curvature of the wage formation schedule, a reasonable estimate is
probably in the range of 2 to 5 percentage points.
It is also true that women have a higher unemployment rate than men in
both France and Spain, but not in the US. A variety of hypothesis can be
formulated to explain such a di¤erence—from pure discrimation to statistical
discrimination, to greater incentives for women to register as unemployed
rather than as out of the labor force. The latter explanation may be especially
7relevant given that Cohen et al. have found quite similar employment rates
between French and American women.
The next table reports the ”age gradient” of unemployment — i.e., the
relative unemployment rate of the young vs. the middle aged — for each
educational group. This gradient is remarkably constant across categories
when computed as a ratio and is highest in France and lowest in the US,
with Spain in the middle.
Absolute di¤erence Ratio
F USA Sp F USA Sp
E1 17 6.6 25.5 2.57 1.6 2.36
E2 9.05 3.42 20.6 2.72 1.68 2.33
E3 4.7 0.9 41.6 2.42 1.4 4.74
Table 4: the age gradient
Next we perform a similar exercise by looking at the relative unemploy-
ment rate of the least educated. Our benchmark is not the most educated
but the next category, as some speci…c phenomena might be going on for the
best educated.
Absolute di¤. ratio
F USA Sp F USA Sp
16-24 13.5 8.95 8.2 1.94 2.06 1.23
25-49 5.55 5.77 3.3 2.05 2.15 1.21
50-64 5.1 3.4 4.4 1.85 2.06 1.48
table 5: the skill gradient.
The ratios are somewhat more stable than when one looks at di¤erentials
according to age, but the results are striking. The ratio between unskilled
8and skilled unemployment is about 2 in both France and the US, and just 1.2-
1.3 for Spain. Thus, while in Europe it is the young that are hit the hardest
by unemployment relative to other groups, in the US it is the least educated.
This may be ascribed to two factors. First, technology is less biased in favor
of the skilled in Europe, and being unskilled is less of a handicap when there
are more unskilled people around. Second, the two-tier style of labor market
reforms in Europe has concentrated the burden of ‡exibility on new entrants,
especially the young but also women. This is con…rmed by the next tables
that look at labor market ‡ows.
4 Flows
We now compare workers ‡ows across the three countries. Cohen et al. report
monthly ‡ows while our data only allow us to catch quarterly ‡ows. In order
to make the …gures comparable we report the monthly ‡ows consistent with
our data under the hypothesis that hirings and separations follow a Poisson
process. This is done by computing the ”cubic root” of our estimated 3-state
transition matrix. That is, if we call the latter P; Q such that Q3 = P:6
We …rst start by comparing hiring rates, i.e. transitions from unemploy-
ment to employment.
France Spain USA
Males 5.97 7.24 23.8
Females 4.77 4.06 29.4
Table 6: Aggregate job …nding rates
6In practice this is done by …rst diagonalizing P : MFM¡1; where F is diagonal, and
computing Q as Q = M©M¡1; where © is a diagonal matrix with coe¢cients equal to the
cubic roots of the coe¢cients of F:
9The aggregate job …nding rates tell us that Spain is more comparable to
France than to the US. The labor market for men is more active than its
French counterpart, while the reverse holds for women. In both countries
men’s job …nding rate is higher than women’s, while the pattern is inverted
in the US. A variety of explanations can be put forward for that pattern (see
below).
We then compare more deeply by disaggregating across groups.
France USA Spain
E1 8.3 26.5 7.8
16-24 E2 10.85 31.1 8.3
E3 9.7 40.0 4.9
E1 5.2 30.0 8.0
25-49 E2 7.5 30.7 7.05
E3 8.15 22.4 5.1
E1 1.0 36.7 5.6
50-64 E2 1.4 28.5 3.4
E3 3.0 14.8 6.5
Table 7: Monthly hiring rates, males
A few remarkable features should be noted.
First, monthly hiring rates in Spain are similar in magnitude to their
French counter-part that is, far below the US number.
Second, while for the core age group job …nding rates are roughly increas-
ing with education in France, they are declining in both Spain and the US.
This may result from the fact that people are either more choosy or more
specialized. On the other hand, the increasing pattern found in France may
be the result of a ”ranking” ”overquali…cation” e¤ect where the most skilled
are preferred over the least skilled for any given job. This e¤ect dominates
in France, while the former e¤ects dominate in Spain and the US.
10Third, in all three countries there is no evidence that the young have any
more di¢culty to …nd a job than older workers, a point already commented in
the Cohen et al. paper. This con…rms the above made point that the young’s
greater unemployment rate is explained by the fact that they bear the burden
of‡exibility rather than any reluctance of employers tohire them, as would be
suggested by theories blaming youth unemployment on the minimum wage.
Fourth, older workers are at a slight disadvantage in Spain and the U.S.,
while the French data suggest they are almost excluded from the workforce,
with hiring rates as low as 1 % for the least educated. This is consistent with
the very large wage loss found for these workers by Cohen et al. for France
and Rosolia and Saint-Paul for Spain. The interesting question is why is
France so di¤erent in terms of the treatment of 50-64 year old workers. One
possible explanation is the prevalence of early retirement schemes and of
other labour market policies that exclude the ”old” to ”make room for the
young”, based on the widespread fallacy that total employment is …xed.
The next table reports female hiring rates.
France USA Spain
E1 7.0 24.2 5.9
16-24 E2 10 29.4 4.96
E3 21.3 50.0 6.4
E1 4.2 22.1 3.5
25-49 E2 6.82 25.1 2.95
E3 8.4 27.2 1.0
E1 0.7 16.2 2.8
50-64 E2 2.05 25.05 2.1
E3 1.5 0.0
Table 8: Female hiring rates
The Spanish data suggest that Spanish society is more ”traditional” than
11either French or US society.
For the 16-24 year old the job …nding rates are comparable between men
and women in all three countries, indeed higher for women in the most ed-
ucated groups (as much as twice higher in France), perhaps because men
elect more specialized occupations. Yet even for the young the Spanish ‡ows
are typically lower for women than for men (except for the most educated
group), whereas they are basically the same for men and women in France
and the US, and higher for women in the most educated groups.
In the core age group hiring rates are quite similar across sexes in both
France and the US, while they are dramatically lower for women in Spain.
This may be due to the fact that they do not search as intensively as men
because they are more likely to be secondary earners (and also because the
primary earner is less likely to be unemployed, as many Spanish study show
a very low unemployment rate for household heads); or to the fact that
employers prefer male applicants (discrimination). The two explanations are
not mutually exclusive.
It would be interesting to know whether the di¤erence of hiring rates
between young and middle aged-women is a cohort e¤ect or an age e¤ect.
Do young women …nd job more quickly in Spain than older ones because
”times are changing” or because women’s attachement to the workforce goes
down after child-bearing?
We now turn to the analysis of job loss. The …rst table shows aggregate
rates and the next one decomposes across groups. It is not clear in the
Cohen et al. paper whether job loss represents transitions from employment
to unemployment or from employment to either unemployment or out of the
labor force. Furthermore the concepts might not be that easy to compare
across countries. For this reason, for Spain we report both a lower bound
which is the employment to unemployment ‡ow, and an upper bound which
is the out‡ow from employment.
12France USA Spain
Lower Bound Upper Bound
Males 0.5 2.84 1.47 2.07
Females 0.83 3.18 1.79 2.93
Table 9: Aggregate job loss.
France USA Spain
Lower Bound Upper Bound
E1 3.2 10.8 5 6.1
16-24 E2 2.6 6.6 3.6 5.5
E3 1.2 1.3 3 10.5
E1 0.69 5.4 1.8 2.1
25-49 E2 0.48 2.05 1.33 1.53
E3 0.38 1.3 0.5 0.7
E1 1.1 3.6 0.6 1.6
50-64 E2 0.7 2.6 0.32 1.0
E3 0.52 1.55 0.2 0.6
Table 10: Male job loss rate.
A few very interesting patterns emerge from this table.
First, Spain, just like France, has much smaller job loss rates than the U.S.
This is clearly due to the more stringent job security legislation in Europe
compared to the US.
Second, however, job loss is much more likely to occur in Spain than
in France. In other words, the higher Spanish unemployment compared to
France seems much more due to high job loss than to low job …nding. An
obvious suspect for explaining that is the wide use of temporary contracts
by Spanish …rms. It looks as if they increased job destruction but not job
creation! However, if it was the only story it would not explain why un-
employment was so high prior to the liberalization of temporary contracts.
One possible explanation, is that then job creation was much lower, and that
13temporary contracts increased job creation and job destruction by similar
proportions, leaving the overall unemployment rate essentially unchanged.
But then, that would imply that absent temporary contracts, job …nding
rates would be much lower than in France, a feature di¢cult to interpret.
More could be obtained by looking at ‡ow prior to the reform, i.e. prior
to 1984, but this runs into the di¢culty that the Labour force survey has a
panel structure only since 1986, and the panel dimension is essential in order
to compute ‡ows.
Third, overall Spain reproduces the features ofthe other economies, namely
a job loss rate that is falling with age and education (while the job …nding
rate is less sensitive to education). Note however that in both France and
Spain, the job loss rate for young workers is 3 to 6 times greater than for the
middle-aged, while in the U.S. it is 1 to 3 times greater. Thus in Europe the
young’s jobs are much more precarious relative to the middle-aged than in
the U.S., con…rming our point that they bear the burden of ‡exibility.
Finally, women’s job loss rate is higher than men’s in all three countries,
with the relative di¤erence being perhaps highest in France.
5 Non stationarity in hazard rates
Our data allow us to compute transition rates both on a quarterly basis and
on a yearly basis. One can therefore compute the di¤erence between yearly
transition rates and their predicted values under the assumption that transi-
tion probabilities per unit of time are constant — i.e. under the assumption
that the underlying process is Markov.
Discrepancies between the two may stem from several sources. Consider
for example the exit from unemployment into employment (”job …nding”).
If we …nd that job …nding over a horizon of one year is lower than predicted
by the Markov model, this may be an indication that exit rates from unem-
14ployment are falling with the duration of the unemployment spell (negative
duration dependence). But, it may also mean that the jobs found by unem-
ployed people are more precarious —i.e., have a higher death rate — than
the average of the economy, so that a greater fraction of them will be back
to unemployment after one year. We call that phenomenon unemployment
recurrence.
For any two states A and B; we de…ne as the path dependence index for
the ‡ow from A to B the following quantity:





where YAB is the transition rate from A to B computed on a yearly basis, and
Y Markov
AB is its predicted value on the basis of the quarterly transition matrix
raised at the fourth power.
A positive index implies that YAB < Y Markov
AB : This means that conditional
on what happens meanwhile, being in unemployment at t typically increases
the probability of being unemployed one year from t: Path dependence re‡ects
both the contribution of duration dependence and unemployment recurrence.
These two phenomena may in turn be either ”genuine” — i.e., a given person
has lower chances to …nd a job if he or she has been unemployed longer — or
re‡ect unobserved heterogeneity — i.e., long-term unemployed have a lower
quality on average and therefore a lower exit rate.
5.1 Path dependence in Spain
We …rst compute our path dependence index for the various categories of the
Spanish economy. We now use a decomposition into 4 educational groups,
splitting group E2 into general and vocational training.
Tables 11 and 12 summarize the path dependence index for men, for job
loss and job …nding respectively. Tables 13 and 14 give the same information
for women; these …gures are very unreliable for women older than 50 because
15there are only few people in each cell; we therefore do not report the results
for that group.
The stylized facts are the following:
1. Transitions from employment to unemployment exhibit positive path
dependence both for men and women. This means that job loss falls as
tenure increases; or that people who just lost their jobs are back into the
employment pool more quickly than the average of the unemployed, perhaps
because of negative duration dependence of exit rates from unemployment.
2. Exits from unemployment also exhibit path dependence for both men
and women.
3. For both men and women, path dependence is typically increasing with
education as far as job …nding is concerned. This suggests that accumulation
of speci…c human capital on the job is more important for workers with higher
education, implying a steeper negative e¤ect of tenure on the job loss rate.
The case of young women is particularly salient. For this group, job loss is
increasing with education on a quarterly basis but falling on a yearly basis.
4. For men, path dependence in job …nding rates does not depend on
education, except for the young where it is clearly decreasing with educa-
tion. This suggests that unemployment recurrence and/or negative duration
dependence is more pronounced at low education levels, for the young, while
for older workers it seems to be evenly distributed across educational levels.
For women, path dependence in job …nding rates decreases with education
for both the young and the middle-aged.
16Category Yearly in‡ow Yearly equivalent P.D.I.
16-24 years E1 17.8 28.4 0.37
E2.1 11.3 17.7 0.36
E2.2 11.7 18.4 0.36
E3 10.8 18.5 0.41
25-49 years E1 6.6 12.1 0.45
E2.1 4.9 10.3 0.52
E2.2 3.7 8.7 0.57
E3 1.9 4.6 0.59
50-64 years E1 3.4 4.4 0.22
E2.1 1.7 3.1 0.45
E2.2 3.1 2.9 -0.06
E3 0.8 2.1 0.61
Table 11: Path dependence in male job loss rate
Category Yearly out‡ow Yearly equivalent P.D.I.
16-24 years E1 29.5 42.8 0.31
E2.1 32.9 39.5 0.17
E2.2 32.6 40.4 0.19
E3 20.8 21.2 0.02
25-49 years E1 35.4 54.9 0.35
E2.1 37 52.3 0.29
E2.2 35.4 54.6 0.35
E3 27.3 42.4 0.36
50-64 years E1 19.2 37.9 0.49
E2.1 17.9 24.6 0.27
E2.2 22.2 41.7 0.46
E3 25 53.5 0.53
Table 12: Path dependence in job …nding rates; men.
17Category Yearly in‡ow Yearly equivalent P.D.I.
16-24 years E1 21.2 24.1 0.12
E2.1 14.9 22.2 0.32
E2.2 14.1 25.1 0.43
E3 13.1 40.1 0.67
25-49 years E1 5.9 12.1 0.51
E2.1 5.8 11.8 0.51
E2.2 5.8 15.5 0.62
E3 3.9 8.3 0.53
Table 13: Path dependence in female job loss rate
Category Yearly out‡ow Yearly equivalent P.D.I.
16-24 years E1 19.2 34.8 0.44
E2.1 22.1 25.3 0.126
E2.2 23.7 27.7 0.144
E3 28.8 27.5 -0.04
25-49 years E1 15.9 24.3 0.34
E2.1 14.1 24 0.41
E2.2 14.1 21.2 0.33
E3 24.6 29.8 0.17
Table 14: Path dependence in job …nding rates; women.
In order to get a grasp at the phenomenon of unemployment recurrence,
i.e. to disentangle it from duration dependence as a source of path depen-
dence, we have estimated a probit regression explaining the probability of
losing one’s job as a function of the worker’s characteristics.7 This is obvi-
ously a gross way of testing for recurrence, as ideally one would prefer to
condition over the whole labor market history of the worker. However, be-
cause of the limited panel dimension of the Spanish Labour Force Survey, we
restrict ourselves to tenure in the current job. The results con…rm a declining
7In order to increase the quality of the econometric results, the estimation was carried
for years 92,94 and 96 pooled.
18dependence of job loss with respect to tenure. The following table illustrates
the e¤ect. The e¤ect is relatively modest.
Category Tenure=0 Tenure=2 years












Table 15: Quarterly job loss rate by tenure (men).
Therefore, while there is evidence of unemployment recurrence in Spain,
it does not seem to be a very important phenomenon quantitatively, even
though fresh hires are more likely to hold a temporary contract. The bulk of
path dependence is explained by duration dependence, a phenomenon widely
documented elsewhere (see e.g. Bover and Gómez (1999)). That is, while
the long-term unemployed have trouble …nding jobs, unemployment spells
do not seem to result in a state of ”precariuousness”, with frequent spells
between employment and unemployment.
196 Discrimination between employed and un-
employed job seekers
Another important aspect of the labor market that we have neglected up
to now is the pattern of job-to-job mobility. In a rigid labor market we
expect increased job to job mobility to partly make up for reduced mobility
from unemployment to employment, because workers who want to change
jobs are reluctant to go through a period of unemployment and prefer to
search on the job instead. Furthermore, as Kugler and Saint-Paul (1999)
argue, labor market rigidities induce employers to prefer hiring employed
job seekers over unemployed ones because employment protection regulation
makes them more sensitive to unobserved workers quality — i.e., hiring an
employed job seeker provides and insurance against bad worker quality. The
basic intuition is that low ability workers are more likely to lose their jobs
than high ability ones, so that the pool of unemployed workers is of lower
quality than the pool of employed job seekers. Absent employment protection
legislation hiring someone is a one way bet as one can always get rid of the
worker if he or she turned out to be of low quality. The more stringent that
legislation, the more employers are reluctant to take the risk of hiring an
unemployed worker, and the lower the exit rate of the unemployed relative
to the employed.
To what extent is that phenomenon present in the Spanish labor market?
To measure it we just compute the ratio between the quarterly exit rate from
unemployment and the job …nding rate of employed job seekers, as de…ned
by those employed workers who state that they are looking for another job in
the EPA questionnaire. We call this ratio the Unemployment Discrimiation
Indicator. The lower that indicator, the greater the discrimination against
the unemployed. The following table reports the results, where again we only
use three employment categories.
20Category U.D.I (Men) U.D.I. (Women)
16-24 E1 0.56 0.51
E2 0.62 0.43
E3 0.40 0.5
25-49 E1 0.57 0.32
E2 0.54 0.26
E3 0.44 0.36
50-65 E1 0.38 0.39
E2 0.17 0.14
Table 16: Unemployment Discrimination Indicator
The table clearly con…rms that the unemployed have a lower probability
to …nd a job than employed job seekers, with a ratio of about 0.5. Another
interesting aspect is that at least for men, discrimination against the unem-
ployed increases with the worker’s education. At face value, this may sound
paradoxical because one might believe rigidities to be more binding for less
educated workers. We suspect that our results indicate that unobserved abil-
ity is more of an issue at higher education levels. Interestingly, this does not
seem to be so much true for women.
To further deepen our understanding of this phenomenon, we distinguish
according to the type of contract of the new job. It is well known that
the Spanish labor market has temporary and permanent workers, with the
majority of new hires being on temporary contracts. A priori one might
expect employers to be more reluctant to give a permament contract to an
unemployed job seeker, since the employer is more likely to regret such a
decision due to the expected lower quality of the pool of applicants. hence,
we expect the proportion of temporary contracts in a new job to be higher
for unemployed job seekers than employed job seekers, or, equivalently, that
the unemployment discrimination indicator is lower in permanent contracts
21than in temporary ones.
The following table tests that hypothesis by comparing the share of tem-
porary contracts in new jobs for both employed and unemployed applicants.
Category Unemployed Employed
16-24 E1 91.11 97.0
E2 96.05 94.5
E3 86.9 94.6
25-49 E1 91.6 93.8
E2 89.1 93.3
E3 79.5 84.7
50-65 E1 91.4 93.1
E2 87.5 88.5
E3 66.7 71.4
Table 17: Share of temporary contracts in new jobs according to job
seeker characteristics; men.
Category Unemployed Employed
16-24 E1 86.7 92.7
E2 90.9 93.7
E3 93.6 95.1
25-49 E1 86.1 92.7
E2 89.6 92.0
E3 90.1 88.7
50-65 E1 81.6 87.3
E2 55.6 80.9
E3 75.0 80
Table 18: Share of temporary contracts in new jobs according to job
seeker characteristics; women.
22The table con…rms the earlier …ndings of the literature, namely that tem-
porary contracts account for the vast majority of new hires. More interest-
ingly, with the exception of older women for whom there are too few observa-
tions to draw any con…dent conclusion, the results go strikingly against our
prior. The fraction of new jobs that are temporary is systematically higher
for employed job seekers than for unemployed job seekers.
This may indicate that discrimination by the employer is not an important
phenomenon, and that the lower job …nding probability of the unemployed
job seekers may be due to other factors, such as the disincentive e¤ects of un-
employment bene…ts. Another interpretation, however, is that workers di¤er
across their (unobservable) preference for job duration, so that those who
prefer long jobs will turn down o¤ers more often and will represent a greater
fraction of the unemployed. Because of this composition e¤ect the unem-
ployed are more likely to end up with a permanent contract than employed
job seekers. Hence, in order to capture the pure e¤ect of discrimination, it
would be necessary to come up with a proxy for the unobservable taste for
secure jobs.
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